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Introduction: Definitions and Naming Problems in Behavioral Economics 
Definition of Behavioral Economics 
Behavioral economics is the subfield of economics that borrows from psychology, 
empirically tests assumptions used elsewhere in economics, and provides theories that aim to be 
more realistic and closely tied to experimental and field data.  In a frequently cited survey article, 
Rabin (1998) describes behavioral economics as ―psychology and economics,‖ which is a 
frequently used synonym for behavioral economics.  Similarly, Camerer (1999) defines 
behavioral economics as a research program aimed at reunifying psychology and economics.    
Reunification is a relevant description because of the rather tumultuous relationship 
between psychology and economics in the arc of economic history.  A number of preeminent 
founders of important schools of economic thought, including Adam Smith, wrote extensively on 
psychological dimensions of human experience and economic behavior, while later economists 
sometimes sought explicitly to exclude psychology from economic analysis.  For example, 
Slutsky, whose famous equation is taught to nearly all upper-level microeconomics students, 
sought to erect a boundary excluding psychology from economics: ―[I]f we wish to place 
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economic science upon a solid basis, we must make it completely independent of psychological 
assumptions‖ (Slutsky, 1915, p. 27).   
Although historical accounts vary, one standard narrative holds that in the 20
th
 century 
neoclassical economists made an intentional break with psychology in contrast to earlier classical 
and institutional economists who actively integrated psychology into their writings on economics 
(e.g., Bruni and Sugden, 2007).  In 20
th
 century economics‘ break with psychology, one 
especially important source is Milton Friedman‘s (1953) essay.  In it, Friedman argues that 
unrealistic or even obviously untrue assumptions—especially, the core assumption used 
throughout much of contemporary economics (including much of behavioral economics) that all 
behavior can be modeled as resulting from decision makers solving constrained optimization 
problems—are perfectly legitimate, so long as they produce accurate predictions. Friedman put 
forth the analogy of a billiards player selecting shots ―as if‖ he or she were solving a set of 
equations describing the paths of billiards balls based on Newtonian physics.  We know that 
most expert billiards players have not studied academic physics and therefore do not in fact solve 
a set of equations each time they set up a shot.  Nevertheless, Friedman argues that this model 
based on manifestly wrong assumptions should be judged strictly in terms of the predictions it 
makes and not the realism of its assumptions.   
In contrast to Friedman‘s professed lack of interest in investigating the realism of 
assumptions, behavioral economists have made it a core theme in their work to empirically test 
assumptions in economic models and modify theory according to the results they observe.  In 
spite of this difference with neoclassical economists like Friedman, behavioral economists 
frequently use as-if arguments to defend behavioral models, leading some methodological 
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observers to see more similarity than contrast in the behavioral and neoclassical approaches 
(Berg and Gigerenzer, forthcoming). 
 
Bounded Rationality 
 The term bounded rationality, coined by Nobel laureate, Herbert Simon, is strongly 
associated with behavioral economics, although there appears to be far less agreement on the 
term‘s meaning.  The neoclassical model assumes that economic man, or homo economicus, is 
infinitely self-interested, infinitely capable of processing information and solving optimization 
problems, and infinitely self-disciplined or self-consistent when it comes to having the willpower 
to execute one‘s plans—whether those plans concern how much junk food to eat or how much to 
save for retirement.  In contrast, much of behavioral economics focuses on limits, or bounds, on 
one or more of these three assumptions. Thus, bounded self-interest, bounded information 
processing capacity, and bounded willpower are three guiding themes in the behavioral 
economics literature.  
 Bounded self-interest enjoys widespread interest in behavioral economics, which has 
proposed numerous models of so-called social preferences to address a number of observations 
from human experiments that appear to falsify the assumption that people maximize their own 
monetary payoffs.   A decision maker with social preferences cares about the material or 
monetary payoffs of others as well as his or her own, although the manner in which concern for 
others‘ payoffs is expressed can take a variety of forms.  For example, a person with social 
preferences might be happier when others are worse off, which is sometimes described as spite; 
happier when others are better off, which is sometimes described as altruism; prefer equal over 
unequal allocations of money, which is sometimes described as inequality aversion; prefer 
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allocations in which the sum of all people‘s payoffs is maximized, which is sometimes described 
as a preference for social welfare; prefer allocations in which the least well-off person has a 
larger payoff, which is sometimes described as a Rawlsian preference; or prefer allocations of 
resources in which his or her payoff is large relative to others, which is sometimes described as a 
competitive preference (Charness and Grosskopf, 2001).  Common to all these variations and 
many other forms of social preferences is that people are not generally indifferent between two 
allocations of payoffs for all members in a group just because their own monetary payoff is the 
same.  This violates the common neoclassical assumption that people are infinitely self-
interested, because it would imply that people are indifferent so long as their own material 
payoffs are held constant.   
 Bounded information-processing capacity is another active area within behavioral 
economics, which would have looked very much out of place in the mainstream economics 
literature only three decades ago. Topics in this area include limited memory, limited attention, 
limited number of degrees of perspective-taking in strategic interaction, limited perceptual 
capacity, distorted beliefs, and decision and inference processes that violate various tenets of 
logic and probability theory (see Camerer, 2003, for examples). 
 Bounded willpower, often described as time-inconsistency or dynamic inconsistency, is 
another large and growing part of the behavioral economics research program.  In the 
neoclassical optimization model, decision makers choose a sequence of actions through time by 
selecting the best feasible sequence, with virtually no mention of the costs associated with 
implementing that plan over the course of people‘s lives.  If there is no new information, then the 
neoclassical inter-temporal choice problem is decided once and for all before the first action in 
the sequence is taken.  Unlike the neoclassical model‘s assumption that acting on the optimal 
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plan of action through time is costless, behavioral economists studying bounded willpower focus 
squarely on the tension between what a person wants him- or herself to do tomorrow versus what 
he or she actually does.  This tension can be described as subjective inconsistency concerning 
what is best for oneself at a specific point in time which, contrary to the neoclassical assumption, 
changes as a function of the time at which the decision is considered.   One can think of planning 
now to start working on a term paper tomorrow but then tomorrow deciding to do something else 
instead—and regretting it after the fact.   
 
Empirical Realism  
Proponents of bringing psychology more deeply into economics argue that it is necessary 
to depart from the assumptions of homo economicus to achieve improved empirical realism (i.e., 
more accurate descriptions of economic behavior, and better predictions following a change in 
policy or other economic conditions).  In an article published in Journal of Business titled 
―Rationality in psychology and economics,‖ Simon (1986, p. S209) writes: 
The substantive theories of rationality that are held by neoclassical economists 
lack an empirically based theory of choice. Procedural theories of rationality, 
which attempt to explain what information people use when making choices and 
how information is processed, could greatly improve the descriptive and 
forecasting ability of economic analysis. 
Improving the empirical realism of economic analysis is a primary and ongoing motivation in 
behavioral economics, frequently stated in the writings and presentations of behavioral 
economists. 
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Example of reference-point dependent utility functions 
Similarly to Simon, Rabin (1998) argues that theories and experimental results from 
psychology enrich mainstream economics.  But Rabin‘s idea about how behavioral 
economists can bring more empirical realism into economics is much more narrowly 
circumscribed than Simon‘s, with Rabin essentially arguing that behavioral economics 
should proceed within the utility maximization model of neoclassical economics.  Despite 
their occasional claims to radical or revolutionary methodological innovation, many 
behavioral economists side with neoclassical economists in viewing constrained optimization 
as a non-negotiable methodological tenet that defines and distinguishes economics from 
other disciplines.  Rabin says that the new empirical content that behavioral economists bring 
to bear will help economics as a whole to more realistically describe people‘s utility 
functions.   
For example, as mentioned earlier in the discussion of the neoclassical model‘s 
assumption of unbounded self-interest, this assumption is often interpreted to mean that 
consumers care only about their own levels of consumption and that workers care only about 
their own income, irrespective of what others are consuming or earning. Behavioral 
economics models, in contrast, allow utility to depend on the difference between one‘s own 
level of consumption or income and a reference-point level.  The reference-point level might 
reflect what one is accustomed to or reflect a social comparison made with respect to the 
average level within a social group.   
Thus, a worker with a behavioral reference-point-dependent utility function might 
prefer an annual salary of $90,000 at a company where the average worker earns $50,000 
over a salary of $95,000 at a company where the average worker earns $200,000.  In the 
7 
 
standard economic model, only the worker‘s own payoffs should determine the  ranking of 
job opportunities, holding all else equal, and not the comparison of one‘s own income with 
that of other workers.  The reference-point-dependent utility function tries to reflect the 
observation that many normal, healthy, and socially intelligent people do in fact care about 
their own payoffs relative to others.  For some workers, it may be worthwhile to trade off a 
few thousand dollars of their own salary for a work environment where the relative pay 
structure is more to their liking (e.g., a feeling of relative high status in the $90,000 job being 
subjectively worth more than the extra $5,000 of income at the $95,000 job).   
It should be mentioned, however, that reference-point-dependent theories in 
behavioral economics are not entirely new.  One finds interpersonal comparisons in Veblen‘s 
concept of conspicuous consumption from his classic The Theory of the Working Class 
(1899) and even earlier among some classical economists.  Gigerenzer (2008) and Jorland 
(1987) have further questioned behavioral economists‘ historical reading of Kahneman and 
Tversky‘s (1979) prospect theory and its reliance on a reference point, which Gigerenzer and 
Jorland argue was already present in Daniel Bernoulli‘s original description of the expected 
utility function.  According to Gigerenzer and Jorland, Bernoulli specified the argument of 
the expected utility function to be a change in, rather than absolute level of, wealth.  This 
would imply that the reference point introduced by Kahneman and Tversky‘s prospect theory 
was in fact a re-introduction, interesting especially in light of Bernoulli and then Kahneman 
and Tversky‘s respective roles in the so-called repair program that began with expected value 
maximization (Güth, 2008; Gigerenzer, 2008, p. 90).   Expected value maximization was, 
before Daniel Bernoulli, the unquestioned standard of rationality in gambling and games of 
chance.  The St. Petersburg Paradox revealed the shortcomings of expected value 
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maximization as a standard of rationality.  Bernoulli introduced nonlinear transformations of 
payoffs--while retaining the weighting and summing operation underlying the mathematical 
expectation--to repair the rationality program which had begun as expected value 
maximization by putting forward expected utility maximization. Then came Allais‘ Paradox, 
which pointed to fundamental problems with expected utility theory.  Once again, a repair 
was put forward by Kahneman and Tversky (1979) whose prospect theory introduced 
nonlinear transformations of probabilities to rationalize anomalous choice behavior while 
retaining the process of weighting and summing—this time, using transformed payoffs and 
transformed probabilities—but still analogous to the mathematical expectation.   More 
recently, Brandstätter, Gigerenzer and Hertwig (2006) introduced alternative psychological 
models of risky choice based on heuristics that depend only on partial information about 
random payoffs. 
 
Debates With Neoclassical and Within Behavioral Economics Concerning Realism of 
Assumptions 
There is active debate between behavioral and non-behavioral economists—and among 
behavioral economists—about the extent to which empirical realism is being achieved by the 
behavioral economics research program.  These two distinct layers of debate need to be 
untangled to appreciate the different issues at play and how behavioral economics is likely to 
influence public policy now that the Obama administration has recruited among its top advisers a 
number of behavioral economists, including Richard Thaler, Cass Sunstein and Daniel 
Kahneman.  
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When trying to convince neoclassical economists who are skeptical about the need for 
behavioral economics, behavioral economists point to the improved ability of their psychology-
inspired models to fit data collected from a variety of sources, including experimental, 
macroeconomic, and financial market data.  Skeptics from outside behavioral economics have 
questioned whether the deviations from neoclassical assumptions have any important 
consequences for the economy as a whole, suggesting that they might perhaps ―average out‖ in 
the aggregate.  Skepticism about the relevance of experimental data remains strong, with many 
doubts expressed about whether the college students who participate in economic experiments 
can be relied upon to teach us anything new about economics, and whether anything learned in 
one laboratory experiment can be generalized to broader populations in the economy—the so-
called problem of external validity.  Experimentalists have responded that the reason they 
carefully incentivize decisions by making subject payments dependent on their decisions is to 
make it costly for them to misrepresent their true preferences.  Experimentalists have addressed 
the issue of external validity by going into the field with so-called field experiments, and by 
conducting experiments among different subpopulations, such as financial market traders, 
Japanese fishermen, and other groups of adult workers (e.g., Carpenter and Seki, 2006). 
Within behavioral economics, a different debate takes place.  Among behavioral 
economists, despite a shared commitment to borrowing from psychology and other disciplines, 
there remains tension over how far to move away from constrained optimization as the singular 
organizing framework of neoclassical theory and in much of behavioral economics, too.  An 
alternative approach, advocated by a minority of more psychology- and less economics-inspired 
behavioral economists, seeks to break more substantially with neoclassical economics, 
dispensing with optimization theory as a necessary step in deriving equations that describe 
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behavior.  Constrained optimization, whether in behavioral or neoclassical economics, assumes 
that decision makers see a well-defined choice set; exhaustively scan this set, plugging each 
possible action into a scalar-valued objective function, which might include parameters intended 
to capture psychological phenomena; weigh the costs and benefits associated with each action, 
which includes psychic costs and benefits; and finally choose the element in the choice set with 
the highest value according to the objective function.  There is very little direct evidence of 
people making decisions—especially high stakes decisions, such as choosing a career, buying a 
house, or choosing whom to marry—according to the constrained optimization process just 
described.  In many real-world decisions such as those just mentioned, the choice set is 
impossibly large to clearly define and exhaustively search through.  In other settings such as 
choosing a life partner or whom to marry, constrained optimization would be seen by some to 
violate important social norms. 
Instead, critics such as Gigerenzer and Selten (2001) attempt to base theory directly on 
empirical description of actual decision processes.  Like other economists, these critics use 
equations to describe behavior.  However, their behavioral equations skip the step of deriving 
behavioral equations as solutions to constrained optimization problems.  To these researchers, 
theorizing and observing how decision makers deal with the overwhelmingly high-dimensional 
choice sets they face, quickly searching for a good-enough action and discarding the rest, is a 
fundamental scientific question of primary importance.  Herbert Simon referred to such 
threshold-seeking behavior as satisficing as distinct from optimizing. 
 Indeed, some leading voices in the applied area of marketing have recently discovered 
that they can make improved predictions about the way customers search for information and 
make purchase decisions by abandoning the optimization model.  One reason why optimization 
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does not explain observed consumer behavior is that it takes too long.  For example, when 
shopping for a cell phone with a choice set containing 100 possible phones, the process of 
scoring each phone according to an objective function that depends on a vector of 15 phone 
features requires exhaustive search through all features of all phones, which is 100×15 = 1,500 
pieces of information.  Similarly, a complete ranking of all 100 phones would require 
consideration of all possible pairs, of which there are thousands.  Very few people actually shop 
for cell phones like this (Yee, Dahan, Hauser and Orlin, 2007).  Instead, data about customers‘ 
information search suggests that a handful of threshold criteria are imposed (e.g., the desired 
phone should weigh less than 10 ounces, have a flip-top, and cost less than $200), which 
effectively reduces the choice set of 100 to a manageable set of just a few remaining options, 
about which the customer will look up several more features and then make a choice.  Notice that 
the satisficing or threshold-based conditions which allow for no compensating trade-offs are 
effective precisely because they quickly shrink the choice set to a manageable size and require 
only a small subset of the information about all 100 phones‘ features. 
Thus, the perspective of the Gigerenzer and Selten heuristics school of thought is that 
being smart requires strategies of simplification—using simple heuristics that are appropriately 
matched to the environments in which they are used.  This alternative normative concept that 
asks how well matched decision procedures are to the environments in which they are used is 
referred to by Gigerenzer and Vernon Smith as ecological rationality and stands in contrast to 
axiomatic rationality that dominates in both neoclassical and behavioral economics.  Normative 
evaluation of the way in which experts play chess illustrates the difference between these distinct 
normative concepts.  
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German mathematician, Ernst Zermelo, proved that there exists an optimal strategy in 
chess.  But the combinatorics of many possible paths of play in a game of typical duration lead to 
a strategy space for each player that contains more elements than there are atoms in the universe.  
Although we know it exists, no computer can possibly compute the optimal chess strategy.  
Therefore, when describing the actual behavior of real-world chess champions (or expert 
computer programs that play chess), the debate in behavioral economics amounts to the 
following.  Is the interesting scientific question whether chess champions fail to optimize (even 
when they win)?  Or is the relevant scientific challenge to describe the thought processes that 
enable people to win?   
A more general statement of this problem of scientific relevance is whether to emphasize 
that human behavior differs from the prescriptions given by solutions to constrained optimization 
problems—or whether to focus on describing real human decision processes together with 
factors in the environment that enable people to succeed or fail. Many heuristics that are widely 
regarded as sub-optimal in behavioral economics could very well enjoy an alternative 
interpretation as brilliantly successful tools for making fast decisions in high-dimensional 
environments.  As it stands now, much of the behavioral economics literature focuses on 
documenting deviations and biases with respect to the optimization model, which is equivalent to 
simply reporting that even grand master chess champions fail to play the optimal strategy in 
chess. An alternative empirical approach based on heuristics would study grand masters and 
identify the rules of thumb that they use to play the game as effectively as they do.  The growing 
prominence of scholars and publications addressing these issues reveals the ongoing importance 
of debates over methodology and economic history (e.g., Gigerenzer, Todd and the ABC Group, 
1999; Gilboa, Postlewaite and Schmeidler, 2004; Starmer, 2004, 2005; Heifetz, Shannon and 
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Spiegel, 2007; Bruni and Sugden, 2007; Caplin and Schotter, 2008; Hertwig and Hoffrage, 
forthcoming). 
Critics of the universal constrained optimization model that dominates in neoclassical and 
behavioral economics contend that a huge—and unrealistic—step of simplification is typically 
required when setting up the optimization problem: summarizing everything a person cares about 
with a utility function, or everything that the managers of a firm base their decisions on with a 
simple profit function.  The methodological debate then becomes whether decision scientists 
learn more by assuming decision makers optimize in a pre-simplified world, or whether 
optimization can be productively abandoned in favor of direct empirical description of the 
simplifying strategies people actually use in real-world environments that are typically many 
times more complex than the game of chess.   
 
 Methodological Pluralism 
Another theme in behavioral economics derives from its willingness to borrow from 
psychology and other disciplines such as sociology, biology and neuroscience.  To appreciate 
why methodological pluralism is characteristic of behavioral economics, one should recall that in 
neoclassical economics there is a singular behavioral model applied to all problems as well as a 
number of prominent efforts in economic history to expunge influence from other social sciences 
such as psychology and sociology.  Although the structure of choice sets and the objective 
functions change depending on the application, contemporary economists typically apply the 
maximization principle to virtually every decision problem they consider.  Consumer choice is 
modeled as utility maximization; firm behavior is modeled as profit maximization; and the 
evaluation of public policy is analyzed via a social welfare function whose maximized value 
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depends systematically on parameters representing policy tools.  In contrast, commitment to 
improved empirical description and its normative application to policy problems motivates 
behavioral economists, in many cases, to draw on a wider set of methodological tools, although 
the breadth of this pluralism is a matter of debate as indicated in the previous section. 
 
Naming Problems 
The term ―behavioral economics‖ is generally attributed to George Katona (1951).  
Behavioral economists sometimes joke that the name of their subfield is redundant, since 
economics is a social science in which the objects of study depend directly on human behavior. 
―Isn‘t all economics supposed to be about behavior?,‖ the quip goes.  Despite the appearance of a 
‗distinction with no distinction‘ inherent in its name, proponents of behavioral economics argue 
that there is good reason for the explicit emphasis on accurate description of human behavior as 
indicated by the word ―behavioral‖ in behavioral economics.   
In psychology, there is a sharp distinction between the terms ―behaviorist‖ and 
―behavioral.‖ Behaviorism refers to research and researchers that draw on the work of B. F. 
Skinner in hypothesizing that most behavior can be explained in terms of adaptation to past 
rewards and punishments. Behaviorism rejects investigation of mental states or other psychic 
determinants of behavior.  Thus, behaviorism is more similar to neoclassical economics because 
both schools of thought rely on a singular story about what underlies observed behavior while 
expressing overt antipathy toward the inclusion of mental states, cognitive processing, or 
emotion in their models.  One frequently finds mistaken references to behavioral economists as 
―behaviorists‖ in the popular press, whereas ―behavioralists‖ would be more accurate. 
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Another, albeit more minor, point that occasionally gives rise to confusion is the multiple 
uses of ―psychology and economics‖ as a descriptor of an academic subfield, which can indicate 
subtly different communities of researchers depending on whether it is regarded as a subfield of 
economics or of psychology.  The subfield of psychology referred to as ―psychology and 
economics‖ overlaps in terms of subject matter and actively contributing scholars.  Behavioral 
economists are sometimes regarded by psychologists, however, to overstate the extent to which 
the work of behavioral economists is actually informed by the broad and heterogeneous research 
programs within psychology. 
 
Behavioral Economics and Experimental Economics 
Strong connections between behavioral and experimental economics can be seen in 
behavioral economists‘ reliance on experimental data to test assumptions and motivate new 
theoretical models.  There nevertheless remains a distinction to be made (Camerer and 
Loewenstein, 2004).  Some experimental economists do not identify with behavioral economics 
at all, but rather place their work firmly within the rational choice category, studying, for 
example, the performance of different market institutions and factors that enhance the 
predictions of neoclassical theory.  Experimental economics is defined by the method of 
experimentation whereas behavioral economics is methodologically eclectic.  The two subfields 
have subtly different standards about proper technique for conducting lab experiments and very 
different interests about the kinds of data that are most interesting to collect.  Therefore, it is 
incorrect to automatically place experimental work under the heading of behavioral economics.  
In the other direction, there are many behavioral economists working on theoretical problems or 
using non-experimental data.  Thus, although behavioral and experimental economists frequently 
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work complementarily on related sets of issues, there are strong networks of researchers working 
in the disjoint subsets of these subfields as well.   
 
Frequently Discussed Violations of Internally Consistent Logic 
 This section describes several well-known violations of the rational choice model based 
on reasoning that allegedly suffers from internal inconsistency.  The following example about 
deciding where to buy a textbook illustrates the kind of inconsistencies that are frequently 
studied in behavioral economics.  Readers are encouraged to decide for themselves how 
reasonable or unreasonable these inconsistencies in fact are. 
Suppose you are shopping for a required textbook.  A bookstore across the street from 
where you work sells the book for $80.  Another bookstore, which is 15 minutes away by car or 
public transportation, sells the book for only $45. Which do you choose: A) Buy the book at the 
nearby store for $80, or B) Buy the book at the farther-away store for $45?   
 Just as standard theory does not prescribe whether it is better to spend your money 
buying apples versus oranges, so, too, standard economic theory takes no stand on which choice 
of stores is correct or rational.  But now consider a second choice problem.   
Suppose you are buying a plane ticket to Europe.  The travel agent across the street from 
where you work sells the ticket for $1,120.  Another travel agency, which is 15 minutes away by 
car or public transportation, sells the same ticket for $1,085.  Which do you choose: C) Buy the 
ticket from the nearby agency for $1,120, or D) Buy the ticket at the farther-away store for 
$1,085?   
 Considered in isolation, either A or B is consistent with rationality in the first choice 
problem, and either C or D can be rationalized in the second choice problem—as long as these 
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problems are considered alone.  Internal consistency requires, however, that a rational person 
choosing A in the first problem must choose C in the second problem, and that a rational person 
choosing B in the first problem must choose D in the second problem.   
Based on extensive data from pairs of choices like the ones just described, many people 
prefer B in the first problem (i.e., the $35 saved on the cheaper textbook justifies spending extra 
time and money on the 30-minute round-trip commute) while preferring C in the second problem 
(i.e., the $35 saved on the cheaper airline ticket does not justify spending extra time and money 
on the 30-minute round-trip commute).  According to axiomatic rationality, this pair of choices is 
inconsistent and therefore irrational.  Yet many competent and successful people, without any 
obvious symptoms of economic pathology, choose this very combination of allegedly irrational 
(i.e., inconsistent) decisions. 
 One explanation is that some people weigh the $35 savings in percentage terms relative 
to total price.  An $80 textbook is more than 75% more expensive than a $45 textbook, whereas a 
$1,120 planet ticket is less than 5% more expensive than a $1,085 ticket.  Nevertheless, the logic 
of the cost-benefit model of human behavior at the core of rational choice, or neoclassical, 
economics regards dollars saved—and not percentages saved—as the relevant data.  
Choosing A over B, in the eyes of a neoclassical economist, reveals an algebraic 
inequality: 
 utility of saving $35 > disutility of a 30-minute round-trip commute. 
Choosing D over C reveals another algebraic inequality: 
 utility of saving $35 < disutility of a 30-minute round-trip commute. 
Thus, choosing B over A and C over D leads to inconsistent inequalities, which violate the 
axiomatic definition of a rational preference ordering.  One may justifiably ask, so what?  
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Skepticism over the importance of such violations of axiomatic rationality is discussed in a 
subsequent section under the heading Rationality. 
  
Endowment Effect  
Suppose you walk into a music store looking for a guitar.  The very cheap ones do not 
produce a sound you like.  And most of the guitars with beautiful sounds are priced thousands 
outside your budget.  You finally find one that has a nice sound and a moderate price of $800.  
Given the guitar‘s qualities and its price, you are almost indifferent between owning the guitar 
and parting with $800, on the one hand, versus not owning it and hanging on to your money on 
the other.  You go ahead and buy the guitar.  After bringing it home, enjoying playing it, and 
generally feeling satisfied with your purchase, you receive a phone call the very next day from 
the music store asking if you would sell the guitar back.  The store offers $1,000, giving you an 
extra $200 for your trouble.  Would you sell it back?   
According to the standard cost-benefit theory, if you were indifferent between the guitar 
and $800, then you should be more than happy to sell it back for anything over $800—as long as 
the amount extra includes enough to compensate for the hassle, time and transport costs of 
returning it to the store (and also assuming you haven‘t run into someone else who wants to buy 
the guitar and is willing to pay a higher price).  Hoping to bargain for a higher offer from the 
music store, you might demand something far above $800 at first.  But after bargaining, when 
facing a credible take-it-or-leave-it last offer, anything that gives you $800 plus compensation 
for returning to the store should leave you better off than holding onto the guitar.  
Based on data showing the prevalence of the endowment effect, however, behavioral 
economists would predict that you probably will choose to hang onto the guitar even if the guitar 
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store‘s offer climbed well over $1,000.  The endowment effect occurs whenever owning 
something shifts the price at which one is willing to sell it upward to a significantly higher level 
than the price at which the same person is willing to buy it.  In the neoclassical theory taught in 
undergraduate textbooks with demand curves and indifference curves, an important maintained 
assumption that is not frequently discussed in much depth is that, for small changes in a 
consumer‘s consumption bundle, the amount of money needed to just compensate for a reduction 
in consumption is exactly equal to the consumer‘s willingness to pay to acquire that same change 
in consumption.   
This equivalence between willingness to accept money for a reduction in consumption 
and willingness to pay money to buy the amount by which consumption was reduced implies 
reversibility of demand and indifference curves, which the endowment effect opens up to 
question.  Another description of this assumption is that there is a rock-solid stable relationship 
between quantities of consumption and their subjective valuations that does not change 
depending on what a person is currently consuming.  When current consumption affects how I 
value all other possible combinations of consumption, then all bets are off—demand curves do 
not exist.  Or to put it more precisely, a single person has many different demand curves, one for 
each point in the consumption space at which he or she consumes. 
Kahneman, Knetsch and Thaler (1991) presented data showing that randomly assigned 
ownership systematically increases subjective valuations of goods and services.  In one famous 
experiment, coffee mugs were randomly distributed to half the experimental subjects.  Those 
who did not receive mugs were asked to submit bids to buy a mug, and those who owned a mug 
submitted offers to sell their mug.  There was no negotiating or haggling.  The experimenter 
collected bids and offers, and used these to find a market price at which the quantity supplied 
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was equal to quantity demanded.  The primary finding was that, despite the random assignment 
of ownership, the price at which owners were willing to sell (i.e., willingness to accept) was on 
average twice as large as buyers‘ willingness to pay.  This led to far fewer transactions than one 
would predict using neoclassical theory.  
 In a related experiment, Carmon and Ariely (2000) showed that Duke University students 
who win the right to buy sports tickets in a university lottery valued these tickets—which they 
became the owner of by chance—roughly 14 times as much as students who had entered the 
lottery but did not win.  Some researchers have linked the endowment effect to loss aversion, 
which refers to the phenomenon by which the psychic pain of parting with an object one 
currently owns is greater than the psychic gain from acquiring it.   Thus, rather than ownership 
shifting the pleasure derived from a good or service upward, some experimental evidence 
suggests that an increase in pain at dispossessing oneself of a good or service generates the gap 
by which willingness to accept is significantly higher than willingness to pay.  Other researchers 
have reported findings that cast doubt on the existence of the endowment effect, pointing to 
alternative explanations consistent with standard neoclassical theory (e.g., Hanemann, 1991; 
Shogren et al, 1994; Plott and Zeiler, 2007). 
 
Preference Reversals 
Lichtenstein and Slovic (1971) and Thaler and Tversky (1990) produced evidence that 
shook many observers‘ confidence in a fundamental economic concept—the preference ordering.  
These and other authors‘ observed preference reversals, which call into question the very 
existence of stable preferences that neoclassical analysis depends on, occurred in a variety of 
contexts: gamblers‘ valuations of risky gambles at casinos, citizens‘ valuations of public policies 
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aimed at saving lives, firms‘ evaluations of job applicants, consumers‘ feelings toward everyday 
consumer products, and savers‘ attitudes toward different savings plans.   
In a typical experiment, a group of subjects is asked to choose one of two gambles: A) 
win $4 with probability 8/9, or B) win $40 with probability 1/9.  When asked to choose between 
the two, the less risky gamble A, which provides a high probability of winning a small amount, is 
typically chosen over B, which pays slightly more on average but pays off 0 most of the time.  
Next, another group of experimental subjects is asked to assign a dollar value to both gambles, A 
and B, stating the amount of money they would be willing to pay for A and B, respectively.  
Most subjects typically choose A over B when asked to choose.  But most subjects place a larger 
dollar valuation on gamble B when asked to evaluate in terms of money.  Choosing A over B, 
while valuing B more highly than A in dollar terms, is a preference reversal.  In neoclassical 
theory, a person with a stable preference ordering should produce identical rankings of A and B 
whether it is elicited as a pair-wise choice or in terms of dollar valuations.  A preference reversal 
occurs when two modes of elicitation theorized to produce the same implicit rankings actually 
produce rankings that reverse one another. 
One explanation is that when asked to choose, people focus on the risk of getting zero.  
Gamble A provides a lower risk of getting zero and therefore dominates B by this criterion.  
When asked to give a dollar valuation, however, people tend to focus on the amounts or 
magnitudes of payoffs more than the probabilities of their occurrence.  Focused on the 
magnitude of the largest payoff, gamble B‘s 40 dominates gamble A‘s 4.  These different 
thought processes—prioritizing risks of getting zero, or prioritizing the magnitude of the largest 
payoff, respectively—might be very reasonable approaches to decision making in particular 
contexts.  Nevertheless, they violate the norms defined by the standard definition of a rational 
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preference ordering (see Brandstätter, Gigerenzer and Hertwig‘s, 2006, alternative explanation 
based on their priority heuristic). 
 
Conjunction Fallacy 
In logic, the conjunction of two events, A and B, refers to the combined event where both 
A and B occur.  In set theory, the conjunction of two sets, A and B, is the intersection A∩B. The 
conjunction fallacy refers to an experimental result in which human subjects are said to violate 
one of the basic tenets of the logic underlying probability theory: that the probability of a 
conjunction of events is less than or equal to the probability of any of the events being conjoined. 
In symbols, the definition of probability requires that: 
 P(A∩ B) ≤ P(A) and P(A∩ B) ≤ P(B). 
The reason is that the intersection of A and B can be no larger than A, and no larger than B. 
 Psychologists and linguists have pointed out, however, that people use words like ―and‖ 
in a sophisticated context-dependent manner, and that the everyday meanings of words such as 
―probability‖ and ―chance‖ and ―likelihood‖ can reasonably deviate from definitions that 
economists have in mind.  Consider how interpretations based on narrow logic-based norms 
versus smart everyday interpretations of the word ―and‖ differ in de-coding the following 
invitation sent to me (an economist) by my friend who is a brain surgeon who works at a for-
profit hospital: ―Dear Friends and Colleagues, You are invited to a party at my place this Friday 
night.‖   
Should I interpret this message to mean that I am invited to the party?  According to the 
meaning of ―and‖ dictated by formal logic, I am not invited to this party.  Yes, I am a friend—
but not a colleague, since I do not work at the same location or in the same profession as the 
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woman hosting the party.  Interpreting ―and‖ as a computer would interpret it, I am not in the set 
formed by the conjunction, Friends ∩ Colleagues, and therefore not invited.   
Does this mean that the woman, who addressed the invitation to ―Friends and 
Colleagues‖ while clearly intending to invite anyone who was a friend or a colleague, made a 
logical error? Scholars disagree.  For those who interpret the woman‘s invitation addressed to 
―Friends and Colleagues‖ as evidence of socially intelligent linguistic sophistication, the view is 
that in everyday English ―and‖ can mean logical and (i.e., the set conjunction operator, ∩)—or 
―and‖ can mean logical or (i.e., the set union operator, ).  It depends on context.  Using ―and‖ 
to mean logical or is not necessarily a mistake.   
In contrast, Tversky and Kahneman (1983), who famously reported the conjunction 
fallacy, described it as a logical fallacy and encouraged readers to interpret it as a mistake.  
Tversky and Kahneman presented the following scenario to experimental subjects: 
Linda is 31 years old, single, outspoken, and very bright. She majored in 
philosophy. As a student, she was deeply concerned with issues of discrimination 
and social justice, and also participated in anti-nuclear demonstrations. Which is 
more probable? 
1.  Linda is a bank teller. 
2.  Linda is a bank teller and is active in the feminist movement. 
Given the discussion above, the reader will notice that option 2 describes the 
conjunction of two events and therefore, under usual definitions from formal logic and 
probability theory, the probability of option 1 must be greater or equal than the probability 
of option 2.  Nevertheless, 85% of subjects chose option 2, which Tversky and Kahneman 
labeled as the conjunction fallacy.  Similar experiments produce other conjunction fallacies.  
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For example, when one baseball team is known to be much better than the other, a majority 
of subjects will choose the conjunction of events, ―Team A beats team B by the score 3-0,‖ 
as more likely than ―Team A beats team B.‖ 
Hertwig, Benz and Krauss (2008) show that, after recognizing the sophisticated and 
socially intelligent ways in which people use words like ―and,‖ ―or‖ and ―probable,‖ the 
conjunction fallacy disappears.  That is, rather than indicating shortcomings hardwired into 
humans‘ cognitive architecture, these authors show the conjunction fallacy to be an artifact 
of the gap between meanings attached to words in everyday language versus formal logic.  
 
Measuring Risk and Time Preferences 
Innovative techniques for measuring preferences along a number of dimensions have 
emerged as an interesting subset of behavioral and experimental economics. Given the 
widespread reach of expected utility theory in economics in and outside behavioral economics, 
Eckel and Grossman (2002, 2008) and Holt and Laury (2002) have designed experimental 
instruments for quantifying the extent to which people are risk averse or risk loving.  The Eckel-
Grossman instrument has proven useful in capturing interpersonal variation of risky choice in a 
wide variety of populations, including those with very limited experience interpreting numerical 
risk measures, thanks to its remarkable simplicity.  Together with a parameterized expected 
utility function, their instrument produces quantifiable ranges for an individual‘s risk-aversion 
parameter based on a single choice from among six binary gambles, where each gamble has only 
two possible outcomes, each of which occur with 50% probability.  Reconciling possible 
inconsistencies among risk measures generated by different instruments and exploiting 
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information about subjects whose preferences appear inconsistent is an active area of ongoing 
research (Dave, Eckel, Johnson and Rojas, 2007; Berg, Johnson and Eckel, 2009). 
Behavioral economists have also established commonly used techniques for measuring 
time preferences.  In the standard formulation, a person‘s time preference, or impatience, can be 
identified as the extent to which he trades off larger cash flows arriving in the more distant future 
in favor of smaller cash flows that arrive earlier. Impatience is frequently quantified in terms of 
the subject discount rate, although this depends on auxiliary assumptions about the utility 
function.  A typical set of experimental tasks that produce information about people‘s choices 
over cash flows arriving sooner versus later is the following series of five binary decisions: 
 
 
An experimental subject‘s five choices are coded as zeros and ones, 0 indicating an ―impatient‖ 
choice of 65 arriving today, and 1 indicating a ―patient‖ choice of the later-arriving and larger 
cash flow.  These binary choices are then assembled into sequences that can be ordered from 
least to most patient, with typical choice response sequences 00000 (maximally impatient), 
00001, 00011, 00111, 01111, or 11111 (maximally patient).   
It sometimes occurs that subjects provide non-monotonic responses, for example, 
choosing the patient option when it is 20% larger, but choosing the impatient option when it is 
65 arriving today  
68.25 [5% more] arriving in one year
65 arriving today 
78 [20% more] arriving in one year 
65 arriving today
98.5 [50% more] arriving in one year 
65 arriving today 
130 [100% more] arriving in one year 
65 arriving today
195 [200% more] arriving in one year
Choice 1:    
Choice 2:    
Choice 3:    
Choice 4:    
Choice 5:    
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50% larger.  Different researchers take various approaches to handling these non-monotonic 
responses.  Some ask subjects who submit non-monotonic responses to reconsider their choices 
in an attempt to enforce monotonicity, while others interpret non-monotonicity as valuable 
evidence about alternative decision processes at work in generating choices over gambles, which 
implies that observed choice behavior is based on a process other than the standard of weighing 
rewards for waiting against the disutility of waiting.  
 Hyperbolic discounting is a form of time inconsistency frequently labeled in 
psychological terms (wrongly, in some critics‘ views) as myopia, short-sidedness, or even 
temptation.  Alternative discounting formulas with additional parameters are introduced in this 
approach.  To see the behavioral patterns of interest, suppose a subject first makes the five time-
trade-off choices above, and then makes another five choices over identical time-tradeoff choices 
except that there is a front-end delay that shifts both cash flows forward into the future by an 
equal amount.  In this modified sequence with front-end delay, say, of two years, the first 
decision is between 65 arriving two years from today versus 5% more arriving in three years.  
The second decision with front-end delay is between 65 arriving two years from now versus 20% 
more arriving in three years, and so on.   
Given data collected from two choice sequences with identical durations between the 
arrival of cash flows but different front-end delays, subjects are referred to as time-inconsistent if 
their choices are relatively impatient with no front-end delay (tempted by the immediate 
gratification of $65 arriving today) and relatively more patient with greater front-end delay 
(following the intuition that, ―Well, if I‘m going to wait two years in any case, it doesn‘t hurt 
very much more to wait an additional year).  The implication is that people cannot be modeled 
correctly as time trade-offs by applying a single discount factor in a time-separable utility 
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function, which would imply that rankings of cash flows are invariant to changes in front-end 
delay.   Loewenstein and Thaler (1989) describe the clear-cut predictions of the neoclassical 
theory of inter-temporal choice and the interesting anomalies that are observable in a wide 
variety of data.  These anomalies include discount rates of more than 200% per year among those 
who buy kitchen and household appliances and, at the opposite extreme, negative discount rates 
implied by US taxpayers whose tax withholding is consistently more than the taxes they owe but 
choose to receive a zero-interest tax refund arriving much later than they would receive it if they 
reduced the amount their employers withhold from their paychecks.  
 
Biased Beliefs 
 In contrast to the violations of internally consistent logic discussed in the previous 
section, this section introduces another broad theme in behavioral economics concerning 
subjective beliefs that are objectively incorrect.  The gap between a subjective belief about the 
probability that an event will occur and the objective probability of its occurrence (assuming an 
objective probability exists) is referred to as bias.  The very notion of biased beliefs depends on 
how well-calibrated subjective perceptions are to external benchmarks (i.e., objective 
frequencies of occurrence in the world), whereas the rationality assumptions discussed earlier are 
based solely on internal consistency and make no reference to external normative benchmarks 
when describing what it means to make a good decision.  Studies of biased beliefs confront 
surprisingly subtle challenges, first, in measuring people‘s subjective beliefs and, second, in 
establishing the existence of proper benchmarks (in the form of objective probabilities) against 
which subjective beliefs can be compared. 
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 “All the kids are above average” not as crazy as it sounds  
One sometimes hears people who should know better mistakenly claim that, if most 
people‘s beliefs about an attribute of theirs is different from the average value of that attribute, 
then people‘s beliefs must be systematically wrong (e.g., nearly everyone reporting that they are 
better-than-average drivers in terms of safety).  In a bell-curved or other symmetric probability 
distribution, gaps between what most people believe—the modal response—and the average 
might justifiably be interpreted as evidence of bias.  However, in many real-world probability 
distributions, such as traffic accidents (where a few bad drivers are responsible for most of the 
accidents) or annual income (where a small number of very high-earning individuals pull 
average income well above median income), the sample average is surprisingly non-
representative of most people. 
Consider a society comprised of 999 people who have nothing and one person--call him 
Bill Gates--who owns $1 billion in wealth.  The average person in this society is a millionaire, 
with average wealth = $1,000,000,000 / 1000 = $1 million.  Nearly everyone in this society is 
poorer than average.  Thus, when the modal belief about how wealthy a person is turns out to be 
significantly lower than average wealth, it implies no bias in beliefs.  Realizing this, researchers 
attempt to carefully elicit beliefs about medians and other percentiles that pin down the value of 
some variable X below which a known percentage of the population falls (e.g., Camerer and 
Hogarth, 1999). 
 
Bias implies existence of normative benchmarks 
Bias in econometrics is defined as the difference between the expected value of an 
estimator and the true value of the number(s) being estimated.  In econometrics as well as in 
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everyday usage, asserting that there is a ―bias‖ implies having made an unambiguous 
commitment to what the true or correct value is.  The term bias is ubiquitous in behavioral 
economics, and much of its empirical and theoretical work concerns deviations from normative 
benchmarks that implicitly assert how people ought to behave.  Given the observation that 
people deviate from a benchmark (typically an axiomatic definition of rationality or formal 
logic), there are at least two distinct reactions to consider.   
Most behavioral economists have interpreted observed deviations from the assumptions 
of neoclassical economics as bias, implicitly asserting that neoclassical assumptions are 
undisputed statements defining what good, or smart, economic behavior ought to be.  According 
to this view, people who deviate from the neoclassical benchmarks are making mistakes, which 
is equivalent to saying they are biased.  This, in turn, motivates some authors to recommend 
prescriptive policy changes aimed at de-biasing the choices we make, inducing us to more 
closely conform to the axioms of economic rationality.  Jolls and Sunstein‘s (2006) article, 
―Debiasing Through Law,‖ is one example of behavioralists relying on neoclassical theory as 
their source for normative benchmarks.  They are hardly alone.  These authors also make the 
argument that laws can and should be used to help people conform more closely to neoclassical 
norms.   
Alternative interpretations of observed deviations from neoclassical norms have been put 
forward by those who question whether the neoclassical model provides sound guidance for how 
we ought to behave and by those who fear the paternalistic implications of policies aimed at de-
biasing choice.  One alternative interpretation takes its point of departure from the observation 
that people who systematically violate neoclassical assumptions are also surviving quite 
successfully in their respective economic environments—they are going to college, holding 
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down jobs, having children and grandchildren, etc.  Thus, without glossing Pollyannic on the 
foibles of the human condition, humans‘ resounding adaptive successes must be acknowledged 
in any objective biological assessment.  It is far from obvious that violating tenets of neoclassical 
economics reduces fitness or leads to any significant economic harms.  Earlier, this article gave 
examples demonstrating that conforming with neoclassical assumptions is neither necessary nor 
sufficient for adaptive success in the environments that matter to people.  Therefore, it follows 
that the benchmarks—and not the people violating the benchmarks—are errant.  If this is the 
case, then social scientists should abandon neoclassical benchmarks as normative guideposts in 
favor of more meaningful measures of economic performance, happiness, health, longevity, and 
new measures of adaptive success that have yet to be proposed. 
 
Optimism and Overconfidence 
 Behavioral economics and behavioral finance have produced a large literature on 
overconfidence, which has been defined in at least three distinct ways.  Let X be a random 
variable representing a decision maker‘s payoff at some point in the future.  For example, one 
can think of X as the value of an entrepreneur‘s business in several years time, or the value of an 
investor‘s stock portfolio.  First-order overconfidence (i.e., overconfidence in beliefs about the 
mean of a random variable) is defined as a subjective expected value of X that is larger than the 
objective expected value E[X].   
Second-order overconfidence concerns the variance or second moment of a random 
variable, often interpreted as an inflated belief in the informativeness of a noisy signal.  Let S 
represent a random signal that is observable today and positively correlated with the random 
payoff X.  Positive correlation between S and X can be expressed through the definition S = X + 
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e, where e is a random variable uncorrelated with X.  Thus, the noisy signal S contains the true 
value (which will be revealed in the future) plus noise represented by e.  Second-order 
overconfidence can be expressed mathematically as an inflated belief about the signal-to-noise 
ratio, var(X)/var(e).  Second-order overconfidence therefore involves a distorted belief about the 
second moment of a noisy signal.  This distortion implies that the subjective information content 
of the signal is greater than its objective information content.  If X and S are jointly normal, it is 
possible to write the conditional expectation in a form that shows explicitly how this subjectively 
inflated signal-to-noise ratio would lead a person to excessively update his or her beliefs about X 
conditional on S (relative to a person with objectively correct beliefs).  The conditional 
expectation is: 
E[X|S] = E[X] + (S – E[S])/(1 + 1/(var(X)/var(e))). 
The coefficient on S in the expression above is 1/(1 + 1/(var(X)/var(e))), which measures the 
sensitivity of the conditional expectation of X with respect to changes in S.  It is straightforward 
to show that this coefficient is an increasing function of the signal-to-noise ratio, implying that 
second-order overconfidence (at least under the assumptions of joint normality) is equivalent to 
over-weighting the noisy signal S.  One real-world example of this is when non-expert investors 
consult investment advisors, believing that the information they receive from experts is more 
correlated with the future than it really is.  Another variation on these definitions of 
overconfidence is when inflated beliefs about random payoffs and the information content of 
noisy signals concerns random variables possessed by other people in a strategic interaction 
(Berg and Lien, 2005). 
 
Social Preferences 
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 The standard assumption of unbounded self-interest is often described as a hypothesis 
holding that people only care about their own monetary payoffs and are completely indifferent 
among allocations of payoffs to different people in a group as long as their own payoff is the 
same.  Challenging this assumption, behavioral economists seeking to study the extent to which 
people care about the overall allocation of payoffs among participants in a strategic interaction 
have described their alternative hypothesis as ―social preferences.‖  Researchers studying social 
preferences have sought to remain as close to the standard utility maximization framework as 
possible, modeling and testing the implications of social preferences by introducing utility 
functions that depend on other people‘s monetary payoffs as well as one‘s own payoff.  Two of 
the most famous experiments in behavioral economics, the Dictator Game and the Ultimatum 
Game, are discussed below.  These are formulated as extremely simple two-player games in 
which the hypothesis that people maximize their own monetary payoff makes a clear prediction.  
After hundreds of experimental tests in many places and in the presence of different contextual 
factors, there is widespread consensus that real people‘s behavior typically violates the 
hypothesis of own-payoff maximization.  Attempts to introduce new utility functions with 
parameters measuring the extent to which people put weight on factors other than their own 
monetary payoff (the so-called ―social preferences terms‖ in the utility function) are discussed 
subsequently, as well as the fierce debates about rationality that these models have spawned.   
 
Dictator Game 
 In the Dictator Game, one player is handed a resource endowment, say $10, and then 
decides how to split or allocate it between him or herself and the other player.  The other player 
has no choice to make.  There is typically no communication.  The game is played anonymously 
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and one time only to avoid motivating players to try appearing ―nice‖ in the expectation of future 
reciprocation.  The player making the decision, referred to as the Dictator, can keep all $10 for 
him or herself and give the other player $0.  The Dictator can also choose a $9-$1 split, an $8-$2 
split, a $5-$5 split, and so on.  In versions of the game with unrestricted action spaces, the 
Dictator can keep any amount for him or herself K, 0 ≤ K ≤ 10, leaving the other player with a 
monetary payoff of 10 – K.  The theory that players of games maximize their own monetary 
payoffs without regard for other people‘s payoffs makes a clear prediction in the Dictator Game: 
Dictators will choose to keep everything, maximizing their own monetary payoff at K = 10 and 
allocating 0 to the other player.   
However, when real people play this game, the most common choice by Dictators is a 50-
50 split, even when playing versions of the game with much larger monetary payoffs.  This is a 
clear violation of the hypothesis that people maximize an objective function that depends only on 
one‘s own monetary payoffs, and it is typically interpreted as evidence in favor of social 
preferences.  In other words, the gap between the predictions of standard economic theory and 
the data observed in experiments implies (although this point is open to alternative 
interpretations) that people care about the monetary payoffs of others.  Note that caring about the 
payoffs of others does not imply altruism or benevolence, so that spiteful preferences which 
register increased psychic gain based on the deprivation of others is also a form of social 
preferences. 
  
Ultimatum Game 
In the Ultimatum Game, a Proposer receives an endowment, say $10, and then makes a 
proposed allocation.  Re-using the symbol K to represent the amount the Proposer proposes to 
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keep, the proposed allocation looks similar to the allocation in the Dictator Game: K for the 
Proposer, 0 ≤ K ≤ 10, and 10 – K for the other player, sometimes referred to as the Responder.  
Unlike the Dictator Game, however, the Responder has a binary decision to make in the 
Ultimatum Game: whether to accept the Proposer‘s proposal or not.  If the Responder accepts, 
then payoffs follow the proposal exactly. If the Responder declines the proposal, then both 
players receive 0.  Once again, this game is typically played anonymously and only one time to 
limit the expectation of future reciprocation as a confounding motive when interpreting the 
results.  
As long as the proposal includes any positive payoff for the Responder, a Responder who 
maximizes his or her own monetary payoff will choose to accept, because even a small amount is 
better than zero according to the money-maximization hypothesis.  The subgame perfect 
equilibrium is for the Proposer to offer the smallest positive amount possible to the Responder 
and for the Responder to accept.  For example, if payoffs are restricted to integer values, the 
strict subgame perfect equilibrium is uniquely defined by a proposal in which the Proposer keeps 
$9 and the Responder receives $1, and the Responder accepts this proposal even though it is far 
from an even split. 
Contrary to the theoretical prediction of Proposers offering a $9-$1 split and Responders 
accepting it, the most common proposal in the Ultimatum Game is an even (or nearly even) 50-
50 split.  The Responder‘s behavior is especially interesting to students of social preferences, 
because Responders typically reject unfair offers even though it leaves them with 0 as opposed to 
a small positive amount.  It is this willingness of Responder‘s to choose 0 by rejecting ―unfair‖ 
offers of $9-$1 and higher that provides one of the most decisive pieces of evidence for social 
preferences.  A common interpretation is that the Responder receives more utility from punishing 
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the Proposer for having made an unfair proposal than he or she would get by accepting $1 and 
leaving the Proposer‘s unfair offer unpunished.  This shows that the Responder does not make 
decisions solely on the basis of his or her own payoff, but is considering the payoffs of the other 
player.  In a collaboration between economists and anthropologists, Heinrich, et al. (2001) report 
how widespread and heterogeneous other-regarding behavior is in different societies, 
additionally demonstrating that people‘s experiences in production (i.e., whether their payoffs 
are based on individual or group outcomes) predict differences in behavior in the Ultimatum 
Game.  
 
Extending utility theory to incorporate social preferences 
A well-known approach to modeling social preferences (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999) extends 
the neoclassical utility function (which typically depends only on one‘s own monetary payoffs) 
to include three components: utility from one‘s own payoff (as one finds in a neoclassical utility 
function), utility from the positive deviation between one‘s own payoff and other players‘ 
payoffs (i.e., the pleasure of doing better than others), and a third term placing negative weight 
on negative deviations from other players‘ payoffs (i.e., displeasure of doing worse than others).  
Some authors have introduced models that add similar ―social preferences‖ terms to the utility 
function, for example, placing negative weight on highly unequal allocations, weighted by a 
parameter referred to as inequality aversion.  Psychologists, mathematicians, quantitative 
sociologists and biologists working collaboratively have offered alternative explanations for 
social interactions in terms of heuristics (Hertwig and Hoffrage, forthcoming). 
Critics of the social preferences program draw on distinct points of view. Binmore and 
Shaked (2007) argue that the tools of classical and neoclassical economics can easily take social 
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factors into account and need not be set off from neoclassical economics under distinct ―social 
preferences‖ or ―behavioral economics‖ labels.  Although Binmore and Shaked are correct that, 
in principle, neoclassical utility theory does not preclude other people‘s payoffs from entering 
the utility function, the assumption of unbounded self-interest is indeed a key tenet of 
neoclassical normative theory.  The no-externalities assumption (i.e., people care only about their 
own payoffs, and their actions affect each other only indirectly through market prices) is crucial 
to the validity of the Fundamental Welfare Theorem, which states that competitive markets are 
socially efficient.  It is difficult to overstate the role that this theoretical result has enjoyed in 
guiding public policy toward private versus government provision of services such as healthcare.  
Critics rightly point to this theory‘s reliance on the unrealistic assumptions of no externalities 
and no information asymmetries. 
Binmore and Shaked, and psychologists such as Gerd Gigerenzer, have also criticized 
social preferences models because they contain so many free parameters that it becomes difficult 
to gauge how impressed one should be when it is reported that these models fit experimental data 
with a high R-squared.  Allowing for so many free parameters (potentially two new utility 
parameters for each subject in the sample if subjects are not assumed to have identical utility 
functions) gives the appearance of explaining sample variance in a trivial way.  Questions have 
also been raised about why proponents of social preference models have not done more to check 
that these free parameters are estimated consistently across different data sets—in practice, these 
parameters are allowed to take on new values every time they are estimated with new data.     
Arguing from a different perspective, Berg and Gigerenzer (forthcoming) question 
whether adding more terms to the utility function and then labeling parameters in the utility 
function as ―social preferences‖ parameters provides a genuinely new and more realistic 
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explanation of behavior.  At times, the case for social preferences using social preferences utility 
functions amounts to a logically circular labeling scheme. Proponents of social preference utility 
function maximization essentially argue that, although it is not realistic to assume individuals 
maximize a utility function depending on own payoffs alone, behavioral economics can add 
psychological realism by assuming that individuals maximize a more complicated utility 
function.   
The decision process implied by the maximization of a social preferences utility function 
begins just like any neoclassical model—with exhaustive search through the decision maker‘s 
choice space.  In the case of the Fehr-Schmidt model, it assigns benefits and costs to each 
element in that space based on a weighted sum of the intrinsic benefits of one‘s own payoffs, the 
psychic benefits of being ahead of others, and the psychic costs of falling behind others.  Finally, 
the decision maker chooses the feasible action with the largest utility score based on a 
hypothesized process of weighted summation. If the weights on the ―social preferences‖ that 
register psychic satisfaction or dissatisfaction from deviations between one‘s own and other 
players‘ payoffs are estimated to be different than zero, then Fehr and Schmidt ask us to 
conclude that they have produced evidence confirming the social preference model.   
To see the circularity of the labeling scheme and why it is distinct from a genuine 
theoretical explanation, consider how the social preferences model is used to fit data from the 
ultimatum game.  If Proposers in the ultimatum game share equally or Responders reject positive 
offers, the observed choices can only be fit within the utility maximization framework by 
applying non-zero weights to the ―social preferences‖ terms in the utility function.  Thus, the 
model is used to label or categorize individuals.  One should then be skeptical about 
subsequently explaining the behavior as a consequence of ―social preferences.‖ 
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 Although this approach has gained popularity among behavioral economists, it almost 
surely fails at bringing improved psychological insight regarding the manner in which social 
variables systematically influence choice in real-world settings.  To gauge the intuitive appeal of 
this approach, one should think of a setting in which social variables are likely to loom large, and 
ask oneself whether it sounds reasonable that people deal with these settings by computing the 
benefits of being ahead of others, the costs of falling behind the others, and the intrinsic benefits 
of own payoffs—and, after weighting and adding these three values for each element in the 
choice set, choosing the best.  Berg and Gigerenzer argue that this is not a genuine attempt at 
describing the psychological process underlying high stakes decisions in social settings but rather 
an as-if model staunchly in the tradition of Milton Friedman.   
   
Rationality 
 In the popular press, behavioral economics is often portrayed as a branch of economics 
that points to systematic irrationality in human populations and in markets in particular.  Titles 
like Irrational Exuberance (Schiller, 2000), Predictably Irrational (Ariely, 2008), and much of 
Nobel laureate Daniel Kahneman‘s work documenting deviations from axiomatic definitions of 
rationality, make it easy for non-experts to associate behavioral economics with irrationality.  
Indeed, many behavioral economists in their writing, and especially when describing their results 
verbally, use ―rational‖ as a synonym for behavior that conforms to standard economic theory 
and ―irrational‖ as a catch-all label for behavior that deviates from standard neoclassical 
assumptions.   
One prominent voice in behavioral economics, David Laibson, advocates to aspiring 
behavioral economists that they avoid describing behavior as ―irrational‖ and avoid the 
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ambiguous term ―bounded rationality.‖ Laibson‘s admonition is, however, very frequently 
violated, leading to subtle paradoxes regarding the normative status of the neoclassical model 
within behavioral economics (Berg, 2003).   
 In neoclassical economics, a rational preference ordering is defined as any ranking 
scheme that conforms to the axioms of completeness and transitivity.   In choice under 
uncertainty, many economists—including the seminal contributor Leonard Savage—argue for a 
strong normative interpretation of what has now become the dominant tool in economics for 
modeling choice under uncertainty (Starmer, 2005).  The normative interpretation of expected 
utility theory asserts that choices over probabilistic payoff distributions that can be rationalized 
as having maximized any expected utility function are rational, and those that admit no such 
rationalization are irrational.   
In choice problems that involve trade-offs over time, choices that can be rationalized as 
maximizing a time-consistent objective function are frequently referred to as ―rational,‖ and 
those that cannot as ―irrational.‖  In macroeconomics and beyond, ―rational expectations‖ refers 
to beliefs that are objectively correct, and incorrect beliefs therefore are described as irrational.  
In game theory, researchers often describe behavior that conforms to a Nash Equilibrium as 
rational and all deviations from Nash strategies as irrational. An important intuitive problem 
arises in these uses of the term ―rationality‖—namely, that all parties in a strategic interaction in 
which more than one party is playing an allegedly ―irrational‖ strategy may be strictly better off  
than would be the case if each party accepted economic ―rationality‖ as a prescription for action.  
Two distinct problems arise. First, there is behavior that conforms to axiomatic rationality 
but is manifestly bad or undesirable in many people‘s views.  Second, there is behavior that is 
very reasonable to many people because it achieves a high level of performance, which 
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nevertheless violates axiomatic rationality.  Thus, axiomatic rationality is both too strong and too 
weak.  Too strong because it rules out reasonable behavior as irrational, and too weak because it 
allows for behavior whose consequences for well-being are intuitively bad in many people‘s 
views.  
 Rational preferences impose the requirement of self-consistent choice but typically say 
nothing about how well choices work in the real world, a distinction that psychologists Hastie 
and Rasinski (1988) and Hammond (1996) describe as coherence (internally consistent) versus 
correspondence (well-calibrated to the world) norms.   Thus, dropping out of college, walking 
past a pile of cash on the ground, becoming addicted to drugs, or even committing suicide can be 
rationalized (and regularly have been in the economics literature) as maximizing a rational 
preference ordering, because they can be made to satisfy internal coherence.  Economic 
rationality here imposes nothing more than consistency. 
A rational person can walk past $100 lying on the sidewalk, revealing (within the rational 
choice framework) that his or her disutility of stopping to lean over and pick up the money is 
greater than the benefit of the money.  Rationality requires only that the person is consistent 
about this ranking, never stopping to pick up money on the sidewalk when the amount is $100 or 
less.  In the other direction, a person who drops out of college and then—without anything else 
in his or her life circumstances changing significantly—decides to re-enroll is regarded as 
inconsistent and therefore irrational, even though many parents would no doubt regard this as, on 
the whole, good economic behavior. 
 In expected utility theory, a decision maker can be completely averse to risk or love risk 
taking, but not both.  The requirement of rationality is that all risky choices are consistent.  Thus, 
someone who always takes risks and perhaps is regarded by many as foolish and imprudent 
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would pass the consistency requirement, conforming squarely with axiomatic rationality based 
on consistent foolishness.  In the other direction, a person who buys health insurance (revealing 
him or herself to be risk averse) and also decides to start a new business (revealing him or herself 
to be risk loving) cannot easily be rationalized within expected utility theory because of the 
appearance of inconsistent choices in risky settings. 
 In time trade-off decision problems, consistency allows for both infinite impatience and 
infinite patience, but not in the same person.  A person who, every payday, throws a party and 
spends all his or her money and then starves until next payday passes the consistency test and is 
therefore rational.  Similarly, a person who never spends a dollar of income and deprives him- or 
herself of all consumption over most of the life course is consistent and therefore rational.  
Consistently strange behavior (e.g., blowing one‘s paycheck and starving thereafter until the next 
paycheck) can be rationalized, but inconsistent behavior—even when it seems to reflect a 
positive step in a person‘s maturing or taking responsibility for their well being—is labeled 
irrational because it violates consistency.  If the person who previously blew his paycheck every 
payday decides to start saving money for his or her retirement, this would be inconsistent, 
although very reasonable to most people.  These cases illustrate tension between what most 
people regard as sensible economic behavior and the surprising simultaneous tightness and 
looseness of rational choice as it is defined in economics as a criterion for normative evaluation.  
 The rationality of beliefs, when defined as beliefs about probabilities that are objectively 
accurate, is distinct from definitions of axiomatic rationality mentioned above.  Rather than 
internal consistency, objective accuracy requires a correct calibration, or correspondence, to an 
externally measurable standard of performance.  When investigating rational preferences, the 
question is never how close did a person come to consuming the ―right things‖ as defined by 
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some external standard such as nutrition, lifespan or offspring.  Rather, rational preferences 
hinge only on internal consistency.  In many instances, however, discussions of rationality of 
beliefs refer back again to internal consistency rather than objective accuracy.   
The vast literature on non-Bayesian beliefs contains numerous examples of authors who 
refer to internally inconsistent beliefs (i.e., those that violate Bayes Law) as irrational.  One easy-
to-see measure of whether beliefs are internally consistent (in the way that behavioral economists 
have focused on) is whether subjective probabilities from an exhaustive list of mutually 
exclusive events sum to 1.  For example, the events ―today it rains‖ and ―today it does not rain‖ 
are exhaustive and mutually exclusive, assuming there is a clear definition and measurement of 
―rain.‖  Therefore, the logic of probability theory requires that the two probabilities associated 
with these events sum to 1.   
Consider, however, a person who believes that the probability of rain is 0.30 and the 
probability of not rain is 0.71.  Because the probabilities sum to more than 1, these beliefs would 
be described as irrational when using the coherence norm of internal consistency.  If the 
objective probability of rain is, say, 0.29, then these beliefs are very close to the objective truth—
that is, these beliefs correspond very well to the real world although they violate internal 
consistency.  In the other direction, another person might believe that the probability of rain is 
0.90 and the probability of not rain is 0.10, which is internally consistent and therefore rational 
although highly inaccurate.  Hammond (1996) points out that people can be wrong about 
everything they believe and yet perfectly internally consistent. Berg, Biele and Gigerenzer 
(2008) investigate this tension between consistency versus accuracy (i.e., coherence versus 
correspondence) in the beliefs of male economists about prostate cancer.  
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 The paradoxes surrounding rationality are perhaps most evident in game theory.  In the 
Prisoner‘s Dilemma, for example, individual rationality as defined by the Nash Equilibrium of 
the game requires that both players opt for the socially destructive option—defecting instead of 
cooperating.  When the two players behave irrationally by cooperating, however, both of them 
are strictly better off than if they both made the allegedly rational choice.   
Why, then, is cooperating in Prisoners Dilemma described as irrational?  Rationality, 
when used as a synonym for Nash strategies, is merely a stability concept and says nothing about 
the global desirability of the outcome—by individual or aggregate measures.  As mentioned 
before, in Prisoner‘s Dilemma each player is individually better off when both players cooperate 
than when both players defect.  But mutual cooperation is labeled as irrational because each 
player, in individual terms and holding the other players‘ actions constant, could do better still by 
defecting while the other cooperates.  There are many other examples in game theory where the 
Nash Equilibrium yields very low payoffs for all players compared to alternative combinations 
of actions which, because they are not jointly stable with respect to single-player deviations, are 
referred to—unfortunately—as irrational. 
 
Behavioral Economics: Prospects and Problems 
The origins of behavioral economics are many, without clear boundaries or singularly 
defining moments (Hands, 2007; Heukelom, 2007).  And yet, even a cursory look at articles 
published in economics today versus, say, 1980, reveals a far-reaching behavioral shift.  One can 
cite a number of concrete events as markers of the emergence of behavioral economics onto a 
broader stage with wide, mainstream appeal.  One might imagine that such a list would surely 
include Herbert Simon‘s Nobel Prize in 1978.  But prior to the 1990s, behavioral work appeared 
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very infrequently in flagship general interest journals of the economics profession.  A concise 
and, of course, incomplete timeline of milestones in the recent rise of behavioral economics 
would include: Richard Thaler‘s ―Anomalies‖ series, which ran in the Journal of Economic 
Perspectives starting in 1987; hiring patterns at elite business schools and economics 
departments in the 1990s; frequent popular press accounts of behavioral economics in The 
Economist, New York Times and Wall Street Journal in the last 10 years; and the 2002 Nobel 
Prize being awarded to experimental economist, Vernon Smith, and psychologist, Daniel 
Kahneman.  The 1994 Nobel Prize was shared by another economist who is an active 
experimenter and leading voice in game theory and behavioral economics, Reinhardt Selten. 
  A striking element in the arguments of those who have successfully brought behavioral 
economics to mainstream economics audiences is the close similarity to Friedman‘s as-if 
methodology.  In prospect theory, behavioral economics adds new parameters rather than 
psychological realism to repair and add greater statistical fit to an otherwise neoclassical 
weighting-and-summing approach to modeling choice under uncertainty.  In the social 
preferences approach, behavioral economics adds parameters weighting decision makers‘ 
concern for receiving more, or less, than others do to an otherwise neoclassical utility function.  
In inter-temporal choice, behavioral models of time inconsistency add discounting parameters 
with non-exponential weighting schemes while hanging onto the assumption of maximization of 
a time-separable utility function.  Frequently billing itself as a new empirical enterprise aimed at 
uncovering the true preferences of real people, the dominant method in the most widely cited 
innovations to emerge from behavioral economics can be perhaps better described as filtering 
observed choices through otherwise neoclassical constrained optimization problems, with 
augmented utility functions that depend on new functional arguments and parameters. 
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Behavioral economists‘ attempts to filter data through more complexly parameterized 
constrained optimization problems suggests more similarity than difference with respect to 
neoclassical economics.  It will be interesting to see whether moves in the direction of 
neuroeconomics based on brain imaging data portend more radical methodological shifts 
(Camerer, Loewenstein and Prelec, 2005) or rather a strengthening of the core methodological 
tenets of neoclassical economics (Glimcher, 2003).   There is a route not taken, or not yet taken, 
following Herbert Simon‘s call to abandon universalizing, context- and content-free 
characterizations of rational choice in favor of models that explicitly consider the interaction of 
decision processes and the different environments in which they are used—that is, ecological 
rationality (Gigerenzer, Todd, and the ABC Group, 1999). 
Criticisms notwithstanding, a number of new and practical suggestions for designing 
institutions and intervening to help people change their behavior have emerged from the 
behavioral economics literature of recent decades.  These include plans that encourage greater 
levels of retirement savings (Benartzi and Thaler, 2004), higher rates of organ donation (Johnson 
and Goldstein, 2003), controlling the amount of food we eat (Wansink, 2006), and new tools for 
encouraging greater levels of charitable giving (Shang and Croson, 2009).  One recent example 
of behavioral economics being put into practice is President Obama‘s tax cut, which is disbursed 
as a small reduction in monthly tax withholding, thereby increasing workers‘ monthly take-home 
pay by a small amount each month instead of arriving in taxpayers‘ mailboxes as a single check 
for the year.  In the rational choice theory, taxpayers‘ decisions about how much of the tax cut to 
spend should not depend significantly on whether one receives, say, 12 paychecks with an extra 
$50, or a single check for $600 for the entire year.  But behavioral economists like Richard 
Thaler have advised the Obama administration that, in order to induce immediate spending 
46 
 
(which is what most economists call for in response to a recession), it is important that taxpayers 
view tax cuts as an increase in income rather than wealth—in other words, that taxpayers put the 
tax cut proceeds into a ―mental account‖ from which they are relatively more likely to spend 
(Surowiecki, 2009).   
All indications suggest that more empirical findings and theories from behavioral 
economics will make their way into public policy and private organizations aiming to influence 
the behavior of workers and consumers.  Whether these tools will be regarded as benevolent 
interventions that make our environments better matched to our cognitive architecture or an 
Orwellian shift toward psychology-inspired paternalism is currently under debate (Thaler and 
Sunstein, 2003; Berg and Gigerenzer, 2007).  There would seem to be genuine cause for 
optimism regarding behavioral economists‘ widely shared goal of improving the predictive 
accuracy and descriptive realism of economic models that tie economics more closely to 
observational data, while undertaking bolder normative analysis using broader sets of criteria 
that measure how smart, or rational, behavior is. 
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